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WHEN AN EX CAN TAKE IT ALL: THE EFFECT—AND NON-
EFFECT—OF REVOCATION ON A WILL POST-DIVORCE 
MOLLY BRIMMER* 
The culture of marriage is changing.1  Almost fifty percent of present-
day marriages will end in divorce.2  Simultaneously, there has been an in-
crease in the number of individuals choosing to defer marriage.3  Often, the 
decision to postpone marriage is triggered by a desire to be more financially 
stable before tying the knot.4  Although disheartening, the current statutory 
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 1.  After decades of declining marriage rates, steady rates of divorce, distinct changes in the 
“traditional” family structure, and volatile economic times, the American culture surrounding mar-
riage has evolved into something that many members of “The Greatest Generation” would hardly 
recognize.  WENDY WANG & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RECORD SHARE OF 
AMERICANS HAVE NEVER MARRIED: AS VALUES, ECONOMICS AND GENDER PATTERNS CHANGE 
4 (2014), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-24_Never-Married-
Americans.pdf.  See generally TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998), particularly 
the section on “Love, Marriage, and Commitment.”  See also Nuala Calvi, What ‘War Brides’ of 
the Greatest Generation Knew About Marriage, FOX NEWS (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/09/15/what-war-brides-greatest-generation-knew-about-
marriage/; Brett McKay & Kate McKay, 7 Lessons in Manliness from the Greatest Generation, 
THE ART OF MANLINESS (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.artofmanliness.com/2009/04/30/7-lessons-
in-manliness-from-the-greatest-generation/. 
 2.  Jasmin Palacios, Divorce in America [infographic], DAILYINFOGRAPHIC (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://dailyinfographic.com/divorce-in-america-infographic.   
 3.  WANG & PARKER, supra note 1, at 4–5, 23.  For women, the median age for a first mar-
riage is twenty-seven; the median age for a first marriage for men is twenty-nine.  Id.  This is a 
drastic change from 1960, where the median age for a first marriage was twenty for women, and 
twenty-three for men.  Id. 
 4.  See generally id.  According to the 2012 Pew Research Center study, twenty-seven per-
cent of never-married individuals say they are not financially prepared for marriage, with thirty 
percent saying that they have not found someone who has the qualities that they are looking for in 
a spouse.  Id. at 7, 30.  Furthermore, never-married young adults aged twenty-five to thirty-four 
are more likely to cite financial security as the main reason for not being currently married (thirty-
four percent of those ages twenty-five to thirty-four, compared with twenty percent of those thirty-
five and older).  Id. at 14, 30.  Among never-married women, seventy-eight percent say that find-
ing a person with a steady job is very important to them in choosing a spouse or partner.  For nev-
er-married men, forty-six percent share this view.  Id. at 28.  Finding someone who shares similar 
ideas about raising children weighs more heavily for men, with seventy percent of men citing this 
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scheme regarding wills post-divorce, coupled with an individual’s increased 
likelihood of divorce, often results with the fruitful savings of these finan-
cially savvy individuals being left in the most unintended of hands. 
This prudent estate planning nearly always includes a will—a legal 
tool utilized as the last remaining “voice of the testator.”5  When probating 
a will, a court’s primary responsibility is to properly construe and apply tes-
tator intent.6  Because the testator is no longer present to speak about his or 
her wishes and elaborate on this intent, the law requires that the probate 
court adhere stringently to the explicit language stated in the will.7  Given 
the frequency with which individuals fail to update their wills, however, 
such a strict adherence to the text can prove disastrous when a testator fails 
to change his or her estate plan.8  This situation can leave a testator’s cur-
rent loved ones with nothing and an ex-spouse—whom the testator presum-
ably no longer wants to receive a bequest or be named executor under the 
will—with a windfall. 
When finalizing a divorce, a couple’s first priorities usually include 
the emotional and time-consuming issues of asset division, child custody, 
child support, and alimony.9  Changing their individual estate plans to re-
flect their new marital status is typically not at the forefront of their con-
cerns.10  To make matters more difficult, the inheritance consequences of an 
outdated will do not become apparent until after the death of one of the 
former spouses.11  This leaves the decedent’s family and current spouse, if 
there is one, with many unanswered questions, including whether the dece-
dent intended for his or her former spouse to take the bequest included in 
the original will.12 
The Uniform Probate Code’s (“UPC”) revocation upon divorce stat-
ute13 is a statutory response to this common failure to execute a new will 
after divorce.  The statute provides an express rule to clarify these unan-
                                                          
as an important factor.  Id. at 21.  See also Erin Hayes, More Americans Waiting Longer to Marry, 
ABC NEWS (June 29, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130884 (quoting the explana-
tion of why a thirty-one-year-old soon-to-be bride waited to marry: “I wanted to be financially 
secure . . .  I would never want to depend on anybody.”). 
 5.  Reasons to Challenge a Will, FINDLAW, http://estate.findlaw.com/wills/reasons-to-
challenge-a-will.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Hailey H. David, Note, The Revocation-Upon-Divorce Doctrine: Tennessee’s Need to 
Adopt The Broader Uniform Probate Code Approach, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 383, 384, 399 (2009) 
(noting the situation “frequently” arises “in which a testator’s former spouse takes assets against 
the testator’s wishes because the testator simply failed or did not have enough time to execute a 
new will after the divorce”). 
 9.  Id. at 384. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See infra note 14. 
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swered questions and to resolve the problem of the unintended former 
spouse beneficiary.  This Comment will illustrate the complications that re-
sult when a state fails to fully adopt the clear bright-line standard set forth 
in the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute, Section 2-804.14  A recent 
Maryland Court of Appeals case, Nichols v. Suiter,15 provides an instructive 
example of the complications that can quickly arise without such a statute.  
State legislatures that have not already done so should universally adopt the 
statutory provisions set forth in the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute, 
Section 2-804.  This would promote the efficient resolution of probate ad-
ministration, protect the common testator who fails to change his will upon 
divorce, and better effectuate the new intentions of the divorced testator. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ 
(now known as the Uniform Law Commission) decision to promulgate the 
UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute resolved a systematic inconsistency 
in American estate jurisprudence.16  The inconsistent state court decisions 
regarding revocation upon divorce contrasted sharply with the Uniform 
Law Commission’s executive goal of uniformity.17  This Comment will 
delve into this inconsistency, with the hope that such an analysis will exem-
plify why state courts should adopt the UPC’s recommended revocation 
upon divorce statute.  Part I.A will discuss the general purpose and devel-
opment of the UPC.18  Part I.B will then focus specifically on the rationale 
                                                          
 14.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1) (2001).  This section states, in pertinent part:  
  (b) [Revocation Upon Divorce.] Except as provided by the express terms of a gov-
erning instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital es-
tate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or an-
nulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: (1) revokes any revocable (A) 
disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his [or her] 
former spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment created by 
law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual’s former 
spouse, (B provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral 
power of appointment on the divorced individual’s former spouse or on a relative of the 
divorced individual’s former spouse, and (C) nomination in a governing instrument, 
nominating a divorced individual’s former spouse or a relative of the divorced individ-
ual’s former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a per-
sonal representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian; and (2) severs 
the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce or 
annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship [or as community property 
with the right of survivorship], transforming the interests of the former spouses into 
equal tenancies in common. 
Id. 
 15.  435 Md. 324, 78 A.3d 344 (2013). 
 16.  See infra Part I.A. 
 17.  See infra Part I.C. 
 18.  See infra Part I.A. 
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and objective principles underlying Section 2-804.19  The Comment then 
conducts a jurisdictional case study, with each subsequent section address-
ing a different type of statutory scheme.  Part I.C.1 will discuss jurisdictions 
whose revocation upon divorce statutes mirror that of the UPC.20  Part I.C.2 
will examine jurisdictions that have failed to adopt a specific revocation 
upon divorce statute and instead rely on general revocation statutes and a 
couple’s property settlement agreements when probating the testator’s 
will.21  Part I.C.3 will evaluate jurisdictions that refuse to revoke any will 
without an explicit revocation statute.22  Part I.C.4 will discuss the rare oc-
currence in which a jurisdiction will totally and explicitly abolish revoca-
tion upon any change in marital status.23  Part I.D will conclude the Back-
ground Section with an edifying case study analysis of the Maryland Court 
of Appeals case, Nichols v. Suiter.24 
A.  The Uniform Probate Code: History, Developments, and Purpose 
Early American probate law developed in a haphazard and piecemeal 
fashion.25  Influenced by the English law that the colonial settlors brought 
with them, states generally followed the standards set forth by the English 
Statute of Frauds, the 1837 Wills Act, or some combination of the two.26  
Because the law in England remained largely inconsistent among different 
localities, individual colonists would often bring a distinct local variation of 
the law to America.27  Thus, probate law varied widely from colony to col-
ony and later, from state to state.28 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(“NCCUSL”) was established in 1892 to address these inconsistencies.29  
Its goal was “to promote uniformity in the law among the several States on 
subjects as to which uniformity is desired and practicable.”30  In 1940, Pro-
                                                          
 19.  See infra Part I.B. 
 20.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 21.  See infra Part I.C.2. 
 22.  See infra Part I.C.3. 
 23.  See infra Part I.C.4 
 24.  See infra Part I.D. 
 25.  Robert Whitman, Revocation and Revival: An Analysis of the 1990 Revision of the Uni-
form Probate Code and Suggestions for the Future, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1992). 
 26.  Id. at 1039.  The author notes that the development of wills in the American colonies was 
influenced by “living English law,” those “norms and practices which developed indigenously, to 
cope with new, special problems of life in the settlements,” as well as “those norms and practices 
that the colonists adopted because of [their ideological beliefs].”  Id. at 1039–40 (quoting 
LAWRENCE FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 35 (2d ed. 1985). 
 27.  Id. at 1039, n.32. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 1041.  
 30.  Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws Const. art. 1.2, available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Constitution.  The National Conference of 
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fessor Thomas E. Atkinson suggested to the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law that the organi-
zation prepare a Model Probate Code; the Section did so in 1946.31  Alt-
hough it provided a basis for statutory revision in several states, fewer than 
half of the states ever fully adopted the Model Probate Code.32  In 1962, the 
NCCUSL, along with the ABA Section on Real Property, Probate, and 
Trusts undertook the Uniform Probate Code project.33  After six years, the 
NCCUSL and the ABA House of Delegates approved the UPC in 1969.34  
The primary purposes of the UPC are: 
(1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of dece-
dents . . . ; (2) to discover and make effective the intent of a dece-
dent in distribution of his property; (3) to promote a speedy and 
efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and 
making distribution to his successors; (4) to facilitate use and en-
forcement of certain trusts; [and] (5) to make uniform the law 
among the various jurisdictions.35 
In its simplest form, the UPC is designed to provide the state legislatures 
with a set of standards that evince “predictability, provability, and correct-
ness.”36 
The UPC has been amended a number of times since 1969, with the 
most substantial revisions to the Code’s revocation sections occurring in 
1990.37  In 1990, the UPC drafters felt it necessary to “fine-tun[e]” the rev-
                                                          
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is also known as the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”); 
see also Frequently Asked Questions, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Frequently%20Asked%20Questions (last visit-
ed Jan. 5, 2014) (noting that the nonpartisan volunteer organization is the source of over 300 acts 
that “secure uniformity of state law when differing laws would undermine the interests of citizens 
throughout the United States”); EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 6 (1953) (noting that the American Bar Association, which was es-
tablished in 1878, also states that one of its principle purposes is the promotion of “uniformity of 
legislation”). 
 31.  Stephanie J. Wilbanks, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow, But Does It Have to be So Compli-
cated?  Transmission of Property at Death in Vermont, 29 VT. L. REV. 895, 900 (2005). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Whitman, supra note 25, at 1042. 
 34.  Wilbanks, supra note 31.   
 35.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b) (2001).  
 36.  Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 901 (generalizing from the UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 
2, general cmt., 8 U.L.A. 144).  “[The UPC] provides a comprehensive and integrated set of rules 
governing the transmission of wealth by will, by non-probate transfers, and by intestacy.  It in-
cludes not only carefully crafted statutory provisions, but also detailed commentary explaining 
those provisions.”  Id. at 903. 
 37.  Id. at 900–01.  The Uniform Probate Code has been substantially revised in 1975, 1982, 
1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2008, and 2010.  Legislative Fact Sheet—
Probate Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
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ocation upon divorce section in order “to give greater effect to the testator’s 
actual intent, to deal with the problems that ha[d] surfaced in post-1969 
case law, and to apply the rules governing probate transfers to non-probate 
transfers.”38  These changes reflected a modern desire to reduce strict ad-
herence to the formalistic probate systems originally used in England, as 
well as simultaneously provide the courts with a more efficient standard to 
determine testator intent.39 
B.  Uniform Probate Code Section 2-804, the Revocation by Divorce 
Statute: Background and Purpose 
Beginning with the Model Probate Code in 1946, the NCCUSL has 
consistently addressed revocation in their recommended proscriptions, 
evincing the importance that drafters have placed on this concept.40  The 
current version of the UPC revocation upon divorce statute, Section 2-
804(b)(1)(i), states: 
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instru-
ment, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the 
marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or 
after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annul-
ment of a marriage: (1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or 
appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his [or 
her] former spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition 
or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a 
relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse.41 
The current 1990 revision broadened the scope of the statute to include 
revocation of certain will substitutes and trusts, such as revocable inter-
vivos trusts, life insurance, retirement benefits, and annuities.42  It also ex-
tended revocation to any provisions in the testator’s will favoring the rela-
tives of the former spouse.43  This expansion of the statute demonstrates the 
UPC drafters’ intent to create a more inclusive revocation statute that co-
                                                          
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Jan. 
14, 2015). 
 38.  Whitman, supra note 25, at 1042–43.  The revocation statute is now UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2-804 (2001). 
 39.  Whitman, supra note 25, at 1061.  See also Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 901–02, 935 
(noting that the revocation sections demonstrate a response to the decline of formalism in favor of 
determining testator intent and that the 1990 revisions indicate that the UPC drafters were less 
concerned with formalism and protecting the testator, but rather, once again, their primary focus 
was on properly effectuating testator’s intent).  
 40.  Whitman, supra note 25, at 1041–42.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09 
(1975); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09 (1982); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09 (1987); 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09 (1990). 
 41.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1)(i) (2001).   
 42.  Id. § 2-804, comments. 
 43.  Id. 
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vers more situations and more people.  The drafters’ decision to use such 
specific language for its lone exception (“except as provided by the express 
terms”) provides evidence that the drafters intended this to be a bright-line 
rule that could only be trumped by an absolute and unequivocal statement 
to the contrary.44 
C.  Jurisdictional Case Study: Analyzing Different Statutory Schemes 
Although the UPC drafters developed the current revocation upon di-
vorce statute to serve as a recommended exemplar for state legislatures, 
many states have not yet heeded the guided advice.  This Section will dis-
cuss the various revocation schemas currently operational in state legisla-
tures throughout the United States, and the implications that each respective 
schema can have on an individual’s will. 
1.  Case Law Illustrations: Jurisdictions with an Explicit 
Revocation upon Divorce Statute 
The UPC provides a bright-line standard for judges to utilize in inter-
preting the will of a testator who fails to change his will after a divorce.45  
The provision mandates that a divorce automatically revokes any and all 
dispositions favoring the former spouse.46  A testator can provide for a for-
mer spouse only if this intention is specifically declared by the express 
terms of the will.47  A number of state jurisdictions have adopted statutes 
that were influenced by this rule promulgated by the UPC.48  A few states 
even adopted statutes that revoked the entire will, as opposed to just the 
provisions affecting the former spouse.49  By choosing to follow the UPC’s 
unambiguous standard, these states offer a clear and certain statute in an of-
ten-convoluted probate process.50 
The Erie County Surrogate’s Court of New York provides clear rea-
soning for adopting its unequivocal bright-line revocation upon divorce 
                                                          
 44.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 45.  See supra Part I.B. 
 46.  See supra note 14. 
 47.  See supra note 14. 
 48.  According to the ULC, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Utah have all enacted the current version of the Uni-
form Probate Code in its entirety, including § 2-804, which applies the revocation upon divorce 
doctrine.  Legislative Fact Sheet—Probate Code, supra note 37. 
 49.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-76 (West 1996).  However, this Georgia law was re-
placed in 1996 by GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-49, which provides that a divorce no longer revokes the 
testator’s will completely, but rather results in the former spouse being treated as having prede-
ceased the testator.  See comments to § 53-4-49 for legislative history.   
 50.  See Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 947 (noting that adoption of the UPC revocation upon 
divorce statute would “clarify unanswered questions in Vermont jurisprudence” regarding the ef-
fect of divorce on a will). 
  
976 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:969 
statute in In re Will of Lampshire.51  This was a case of first impression, yet 
the court voiced strong support for the statute, noting that it was necessary 
in light of the fact that “the public is lax in making or revoking their 
wills.”52  The court also thought the statutory presumption towards revoca-
tion was preferable, as it required the testator to take the affirmative steps 
necessary to include the former spouse if so desired.53  Here, the New York 
revocation upon divorce statute contained nearly the exact same language as 
UPC Section 2-804, in that, according to the Statute, the testator must “ex-
pressly provide[] otherwise.”54  The court found no alternate expressions of 
intention to include the former spouse and held the will revoked.55 
Revocation upon divorce statutes have also been useful in determining 
the effect and impact of a revocation.  The Court of Appeals of Oregon held 
in In re Estate of Crohn56 that revocation of a will is not ambulatory, in that 
whether or not a will is revoked does not depend on the law in effect at the 
time of death, but rather depends on the law in effect at the trigger time of 
revocation—the time of divorce.  Accordingly, at the time of divorce, the 
revocation of a will is “done and complete.”57  Once revoked, a will cannot 
be revived unless “new life is given to it.”58  Here, the testator was divorced 
in 1956, and, at the time, Oregon had enacted a statute revoking a testator’s 
entire will upon divorce.59  In July 1970, the state legislature repealed this 
statute and replaced it with one providing that divorce only revoked those 
                                                          
 51.  292 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1968). 
 52.  Id. at 579; see id. at 579–80 (acknowledging the argument that such a strong statute was 
unnecessary as a testator could simply alter his will after a divorce, the court still found this argu-
ment to be unconvincing). 
 53.  Id. at 579. 
 54.  Id.  At the time, the statute read:  
“(a) If, after executing a will, the testator is divorced, his marriage is annulled or its nul-
lity declared or such marriage is dissolved on the ground of absence, the divorce, an-
nulment, declaration of nullity or dissolution revokes any disposition or appointment of 
property made by the will to the former spouse and any provision therein naming the 
former spouse as executor or trustee, unless the will expressly provides otherwise.”   
Id. at 579–80.   
In 2008, New York enacted a new revocation upon divorce statute that even more closely 
adheres to the language set forth by the UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2011).  See N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (McKinney Supp. 2015) and the Editor’s Notes therein. 
 55.  In re Will of Lampshire, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (noting that “the court should not make a 
new will based on speculation as to what the testator might have intended” (quoting In re Estate of 
Imperato, 254 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1964)). 
 56.  In re Estate of Crohn, 494 P.2d 258 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).  
 57.  Id. at 259 (quoting Estate of Berger, 243 P.2d. 862, 865 (Cal. 1926)). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id at 258–59; see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 114.130 (West 2013) (“A will made by any 
person is deemed revoked by his or her subsequent divorce.”).  This statute has since been re-
pealed and replaced by OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.315 (2013). 
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will provisions in favor of the former spouse.60  The testator died in Sep-
tember of 1970.61  His will gave his entire estate to his former spouse’s son 
by a prior marriage.62  The court held that a revocation upon divorce is a 
“final and complete act.”63  Because the divorce automatically revoked the 
entire will at the immediate time of the divorce, it is of no concern that a 
subsequent statute would not have revoked the will in its entirety.64  Revo-
cation cannot be repealed or revived.65  Simply stated, the court found that 
“what’s done is done.”66 
Courts often utilize a straightforward and bright-line revocation upon 
divorce rule, particularly when faced with a set of contradictory facts.  In In 
re Estate of Pekol,67 the testator executed her will in 1957, bequeathing all 
her real and personal property to her husband.68  Although they divorced in 
1961, the couple cohabited for thirteen years prior to her death in 1983.69  
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District held the testators will 
to be revoked, finding that the divorce decree “forever barred” her ex-
husband from claiming any part of her estate.70  Despite the couple’s thir-
teen-year-long cohabitation, the court asserted that there was “strong public 
policy” favoring the institution of marriage.71 
Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Pence72 
found Missouri’s clear revocation standard instructive.  In 1988, the couple 
signed a will that included a provision not to revoke the will unless both 
parties agreed to it.73  Thirty years later, in 2008, the couple divorced.74  
The testator then died in 2009.75  The court found that the revocation upon 
divorce statute applied and the will was revoked.76  Although the parties 
seemingly had entered into a “contract” not to revoke the will, the contract 
did not include any provision that clearly contemplated the potential for di-
                                                          
 60.  In re Estate of Crohn, 494 P.2d at 259; see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.315 (2013) (“Un-
less a will evidences a different intent of the testator, the divorce or the annulment of the marriage 
of the testator after the execution of the will revokes all provisions in the will in favor of the for-
mer spouse . . . .”). 
 61.  In re Estate of Crohn, 494 P.2d at 259.  
 62.  Id. at 258. 
 63.  Id. at 259. 
 64.  Id. at 260. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 3, sc. 2. 
 67.  499 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
 68.  Id. at 89. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id at 90.  
 72.  327 S.W.3d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 73.  Id. at 572. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 575–76. 
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vorce.77  The court relied on the state legislature’s decision that “a divorce 
should wipe the slate clean as to the divorced spouse, without the testator 
having to go to the time and expense of making a new will.”78  The court 
also observed that, in almost every instance, a divorced person would not 
desire a bequest to the former spouse to remain in effect.79  Therefore, such 
a bequest would often result in an “inequitable windfall in favor of [the 
former spouse].”80  The court found that a divorce should instead have the 
effect of “cutting off” all of the former spouse’s claims to the testator’s es-
tate.81 
Particularly when faced with indeterminate and unusual relationships, 
courts are prone to rely on an express and unequivocal statute.  For exam-
ple, the District Court of Appeal of Florida in Bauer v. Reese82 revoked a 
husband’s will that was executed after the couple’s first marriage—even 
though the couple had later remarried one another!83  The court found the 
Florida statute to be “clear, concise and unambiguous.”84  Furthermore, the 
statute was enacted with a specific legislative purpose “unquestionably di-
rected toward curing the incongruous situation . . . [wherein a] death[] oc-
cur[s] before the testator has had an opportunity following divorce to re-
frame or destroy the existing will.”85  Therefore, in light of the divorce, the 
court held the will to be null and void, and the decedent was left to die in-
testate.86 
A bright-line standard can also facilitate straightforward resolutions to 
complex probate disputes.  Gibboney v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.87 is one such 
example.  In Gibboney, the couple was married in 1975 and divorced in 
1996.88  The testator executed a will in 1973, which set forth four mutually 
exclusive tiers of dispositions.89  The first of these dispositions provided for 
his “surviving wife, lawfully married to decedent on his death date” and the 
fourth of which stated, “if none of the above persons survive decedent, to 
                                                          
 77.  Id. at 574–75. 
 78.  Id. at 574 (quoting In re Bloomer’s Estate, 620 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Mo. 1981)). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id at 575.  The court also notes that the “law favors a statutory interpretation that tends to 
avert unreasonable results.”  Id. (quoting Miles v. Lear. Corp., 259 S.W.3d 64, 75 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2008)). 
 81.  Id. at 576. 
 82.  161 So. 2d 678 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
 83.  Id. at 679, 681. 
 84.  Id. at 680. 
 85.  Id.  The court further reiterated the UPC’s preference for clear expressions of intent when 
it stated, “if [the testator] desires the divorced spouse to participate in his estate, the better rule is 
to require a new will to be executed to that effect.”  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 81. 
 87.  622 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 88.  Id. at 164. 
 89.  Id at 163–64. 
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[name of his former spouse].”90  The North Carolina revocation upon di-
vorce statute states that “unless otherwise specifically provided,” the statute 
revokes all provisions in the will in favor of the former spouse.91  The court 
found that the residual disposition specifically providing for the former 
spouse did not “expressly provide[]” for the case of a divorce.92  Absent any 
such express statement, the court found the will to be revoked.93  Although 
still not as explicit as the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute, the statute 
addressed in Gibboney possesses the same bright-line nature. 
2.  Case Law Illustrations: Revoked, Even Absent a Revocation 
upon Divorce Statute 
In a number of other jurisdictions, state legislatures have not provided 
an explicit revocation upon divorce statute.  Even in the absence of such a 
statute, courts often hold that a divorce will revoke a testamentary provision 
in favor of the testator’s former spouse.  In this situation, courts are prone to 
rely on both the couple’s divorce property settlement94 and the state’s gen-
eral statute providing for revocation upon subsequent change of circum-
stances.  Even without a statute explicitly providing for revocation upon di-
vorce, it is interesting to note that the judicial outcomes remain largely 
consistent with the UPC’s guidelines.  This trend is significant as it suggests 
that an absolute revocation post-divorce is the outcome to which judicial 
courts seek.  Full adoption of the explicit UPC revocation upon divorce 
statute would therefore simply minimize any isolated instances of autono-
mous judicial discretion, as well as enhance consistent results and create 
statutory authority for judicial decisions. 
Without a revocation upon divorce statute, courts may still attempt to 
revoke a will post-divorce.  In Caswell v. Kent,95 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine relied on Maine’s general revocation upon subsequent 
changes statute96 and recent decisions of their fellow courts to revoke the 
                                                          
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See N.C. GEN.STAT. § 31-5.4 (LexisNexis 2013) (emphasis added). 
 92.  Gibboney, 622 S.E.2d at 165.   
 93.  Id. at 165. 
 94.  See Kristen P. Raymond, Double Trouble—An Ex-Spouse’s Life Insurance Beneficiary 
Status & State Automatic Revocation upon Divorce Statutes: Who Gets What?, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 
399, 421–23 (2013) (noting that some jurisdictions hold that a property settlement agreement es-
sentially “wipes the slate clean” between divorcing spouses, revoking all benefits, while others 
hold that the determination of whether a property settlement agreement suffices for revocation 
depends on such factors as the wording and express terms of the agreement). 
 95.  186 A.2d 581 (Me. 1962). 
 96.  Id. at 581.  The statute states that a will could be revoked by operation of law when “sub-
sequent changes in the condition and circumstances of the maker” occurred.  Id.  The court noted 
that while divorce, if anything, should be considered a “subsequent change” that would properly 
and realistically produce a revocation, the “courts have held with almost complete uniformity that 
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testator’s will.97  The court concluded that, when a divorce involves a prop-
erty settlement, a conclusive presumption arises that the testator intended a 
revocation of the testamentary provision favoring his former spouse.98  In 
making this assumption, the court noted that “it is so rare and so unusual” 
for a divorced testator to desire or intend that his former spouse benefit un-
der his will.99  Furthermore, the court found that it is reasonable for the 
court to require a divorced testator to make such an atypical desire and in-
tention manifestly evident either by a properly executed codicil to the cur-
rent will or by the execution of a new will.100  The court further declared 
that its adoption of an “absolute and irrebuttable statutory revocation” is 
necessary in order to eliminate excessive litigation, uncertainty, and unnec-
essary confusion.101  This would provide both protection, as well as notice 
to the ordinary testator, that affirmative action is required if he desires to 
include his former spouse as a beneficiary.102 
Similarly, at the time Rankin v. McDearmon103 was decided, the state 
of Tennessee had no statute governing the revocation of wills, nor any prior 
case law governing the question.104  The Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 
however, did note the firmly established common-law doctrine of implied 
revocation when applied to a marriage coupled with the birth of child.105  
The court analogized and held that a divorce, coupled with a property set-
tlement, should have a similar result.106  Because a testator did not antici-
pate these events at the time of his will execution, the court found that a 
                                                          
divorce alone, unaccompanied by a property settlement, will not produce a revocation by opera-
tion of law.”  Id. at 582. 
 97.  Id. at 584. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 582–83. 
 100.  Id.  The court also relied on the language of Lansing v. Hayes, wherein the majority stat-
ed: “To hold the will unrevoked under these circumstances would be repugnant to that common 
sense and reason upon which law is based.  . . . Such disposition of his property . . . would be unu-
sual, and contrary to common experience.”  Id. at 582 (quoting Lansing v. Hayes, 54 N.W. 699, 
701 (Mich. 1893). 
 101.  Id. at 584. 
 102.  Id. (predicting that “incidents of such desire and intention will be rare indeed”). 
 103.  270 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).   
 104.  Id. at 662.  Tennessee has since adopted a revocation upon divorce statute; effective 
2007.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-202 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 105.  See Rankin, 270 S.W.2d at 662–63 (“[M]arriage and birth of a child after the execution of 
a written will will constitute an implied revocation of such will . . . .”).  The court also noted: 
[H]ere the property rights of the parties to a divorce action have been settled in contem-
plation or anticipation of a divorce, such a settlement followed by a divorce impliedly 
revokes a prior will of one spouse in favor of the other, at least as to the legacies or de-
vises bequeathed the spouse.  Such circumstances have been held conclusive of revoca-
tion rather than as merely raising a rebuttable presumption of revocation.   
Id. at 663 (quoting 57 AM. JUR. 371 Wills § 536 (1953)). 
 106.  See id. at 663 (clarifying that a marriage or the birth of a child alone will not constitute an 
implied revocation; equally, a divorce or a property settlement would not suffice). 
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conclusive presumption should exist that the testator would not want his 
will to stand after these events occurred.107  Here, the couple was married 
for twenty-three years before obtaining a divorce, during which the couple 
executed a property settlement.108  Because these two events reflect such a 
significant change in the domestic life of the testator, the court found that a 
divorce coupled with a property settlement should “sever[] all ties” between 
the spouses.109 
Likewise, in In re Bartlett’s Estate,110 the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
reiterated the “well-established rule . . . that a divorce, coupled with a set-
tlement of the property rights of the parties, is such a change of circum-
stances as to work an implied revocation.”111  The court found that the Ne-
braska statute extended revocation to cases beyond merely those covered by 
common law.112  As such, the court held that a statute calling for revocation 
upon a changed set of circumstances is a “rule of justice and a principle that 
the court should recognize and apply, whenever the change in the condi-
tions or relations of the testator should . . . raise a clear presumption that the 
testator would have desired to make a revocation, had his attention been di-
rected to it.”113  Accordingly, the court found that any claim or share that a 
former spouse may have in a testator’s estate is destroyed.114  The dissent 
placed great weight on the specific facts of the case—here, the divorce re-
sulted from the husband’s breach of marriage vows—and claimed that there 
was a strong argument that the husband did intend to keep his former 
spouse in the will.115  However, if the legislature were to adopt a bright-line 
rule, such as the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute, rather than rely on 
                                                          
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 661. 
 109.  Id. at 663. 
 110.  190 N.W. 869 (Neb. 1922). 
 111.  Id. at 869. 
 112.  See id. at 870 (“The statute, instead of attempting to preserve and provide for those spe-
cific revocations allowed at common law, we believe, sought to preserve and perpetuate the un-
derlying principle only upon which those revocations were based.”  That is, for women, the mar-
riage alone would work to revoke her will and, in the case of a man, marriage and birth of issue 
would have been necessary to revoke his will); see also Hertrais v. Moore, 88 N.E.2d 909, 910 
(Mass. 1949), and In re Battis, 126 N.W. 9, 11 (Wis. 1910), where the courts discussed what con-
stituted implied revocation at common law. 
 113.  In re Bartlett’s Estate, 190 N.W. at 870 (finding this presumption to be clear in the case 
of a divorce and  claiming that “[i]t is beyond reason to suppose that a husband, after a divorce 
and settlement of property rights, should still desire that a will, which he had previously made in 
favor of his wife, should continue, and that his estate should pass to her under the will, to the ex-
clusion of his natural heirs”). 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id. at 871 (Aldrich, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.B and Part II.C. when considering the 
dissent’s interpretation; see also Part II.A. for alternative options that the testator could have uti-
lized in order to effectuate this presumed intent. 
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a discretionary standard, the court’s dissent could have avoided such a 
complex, fact-driven inquiry. 
In In re Battis,116 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was able to avoid 
such an inefficient analysis.  Although the former wife offered evidence that 
the testator maintained a friendly relationship with her, showed her affec-
tion through his actions, and publicly declared that he executed a provision 
in his will for her, the court still held the provisions in the will relating to 
the former spouse had been revoked.117  The court asserted that a divorce 
and subsequent property settlement produces a “complete destruction of 
[the couple’s] legal and moral relations and consequent obligations and du-
ties.”118  Not only does a divorce decree make a former husband and wife 
“strangers” to one another, but the property settlement also operates to “dis-
charge” all moral and legal duties from one spouse to the other.119  There-
fore, an absolute revocation of any provisions favoring the former spouse 
should be revoked.120 
Lang v. Leiter121 illustrates the complications that can arise when rely-
ing on judicial interpretation and a separate, unrelated document to probate 
a will.  In Lang, the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Wood County reiterated 
the rule that a divorce, coupled with a full settlement of property rights, im-
pliedly revoke a will.122  In this case, however, the couple had not executed 
a complete and full property settlement agreement, but rather, a separation 
agreement that only provided for a restoration of their individual and sepa-
rately owned property.123  Thus, the court found no “voluntary arms-length 
separation agreement” that implied an intent to wholly revoke the will and 
reversed the revocation.124 
3.  Case Law Illustrations: If No Explicit Statute, No Revocation 
Many states have not codified the doctrine of revocation upon divorce.  
Although some of these jurisdictions generally reflect judicial outcomes 
that are similar to that which would occur under the UPC,125 others hold 
                                                          
 116.  In re Battis, 126 N.W. 9 (Wis. 1910). 
 117.  See id. at 12 (“A divorce and settlement of their property rights between husband and 
wife operates ipso facto to revoke his will previously made, and no subsequent act of the testator 
not accompanied by the solemnities requisite for the making of a valid will, will revive it.” (quot-
ing Wirth v. Wirth, 113 N.W. 306, 307 (Mich. 1907))). 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id. 
 121.  144 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio 1956). 
 122.  Id. at 333–34. 
 123.  Id. at 332, 334. 
 124.  Id. at 334. 
 125.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
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that a divorce, with or without a property settlement, does not automatically 
revoke the testamentary provisions in favor of the former spouse. 
For example, in Hertrais v. Moore,126 the couple received an absolute 
decree of divorce that included a full property settlement.127  The Massa-
chusetts state legislature had enacted a general statute providing for revoca-
tion of the entire will in the case of subsequent changes in the condition or 
circumstances of the testator.128  Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court 
still held that the testator’s will favoring the former spouse remained valid 
and was not revoked.129  The court relied on the common law interpretation 
of the statute, finding that a revocation of the entire will is “limited to 
[those] very small number of cases at common law.”130  Stressing that it 
would be a serious matter to invalidate a will based on the presupposed 
changed intention of a “reasonable testator,” the court found it more favora-
ble to avoid an absolute revocation.131  The court also warned against ex-
plicitly including divorce in its general revocation statute—presaging that 
other additions could be adopted that would expose testators to the risk of 
unintended revocation.132 
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Michigan in In re Estate of Mer-
cure133 found that an implied revocation arises upon a change of the testa-
tor’s condition or circumstances.134  This decision reflects the “natural” pre-
sumption that the testator intended to revoke these provisions of his will.135  
However, the court held that this was not a “conclusive presumption,” nor 
should the doctrine of “conclusive presumption” even exist.136  Instead, 
when faced with sufficient evidence tending to rebut the presumption of 
revocation, all such evidence must be considered before a court determines 
that a will is revoked.137  The court held that any simple change of condition 
or circumstances alone should not automatically revoke a will.138 
                                                          
 126.  88 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1949). 
 127.  Id. at 909.  
 128.  Id. at 909–10.  Massachusetts has since repealed this statute.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. 190B § 2-508 (West 2012) for the current version. 
 129.  Hertrais, 88 N.E.2d at 912. 
 130.  Id. at 911.  See supra note 105.  The court also noted that previous case law established 
that the death of the wife of the testator, which occurred prior to testator’s own death, did not 
qualify as a change in condition or circumstances such to revoke his will.  Hertrais, 88 N.E.2d at 
911 (citing Bennett v. Brown, 110 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1915)). 
 131.  Hertrais, 88 N.E.2d at 912.   
 132.  Id.   
 133.  216 N.W.2d 914 (Mich. 1974). 
 134.  Id. at 919. 
 135.  Id. at 918. 
 136.  Id. at 916–17, 919.  The court noted its agreement with the finding of an implied revoca-
tion in Lansing v. Haynes, 54 N.W. 699, 700 (1893), which decided that a divorce and property 
settlement raised a strong presumption that there was an intention to revoke the prior will. 
 137.  In re Estate of Mercure, 216 N.W.2d at 919.   
 138.  Id.   
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In In re Estate of Mercure, the testator drafted a will devising his es-
tate to his soon-to-be former spouse.139  He executed this will one day after 
filing the property settlement, but two months prior to the final divorce de-
cree.140  Although his former wife went on to marry another man, the three 
individuals became cordial neighbors, interacting socially and helping one 
another financially.141  Additionally, the testator carried an identification 
card requesting that his former wife be the contact notified in the case of an 
emergency.142  The court found that the accumulation of this circumstantial 
evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of revocation and there-
fore, found the will to be valid.143 
In the Mercure opinion, the court expressed a hope for future legisla-
tion that is particularly illuminating.  The court not only declared that a 
statutorily enacted revocation doctrine would increase efficiency, but it also 
asserted “[o]ur duty would be different,” implying that the court could have 
reached a different conclusion in this case, if not for the lack of such a stat-
ute.144  Stating that a legislatively enacted statute would have “the ad-
vantage of eliminating uncertainty and minimizing litigation,” the court 
maintained that the status of a doctrine established by judicial common law 
can only be maintained by the discretion of the judiciary.145 
4.  Case Law Illustration: Total Abolishment of Revocation upon 
Change in Marital Status 
Over the past century, a small minority of jurisdictions abolished their 
marital revocation statutes.  However, in more recent years, the trend has 
come full-circle; state legislatures have once more returned to the revoca-
tion statutes, concluding that the dissolution of marriage suffices as a signif-
icant enough change in circumstance to revoke a testator’s will. 
This process is illustrated in Lee v. Central Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,146 
in which the court discussed the reasons for the legislature’s recent decision 
to abolish the revocation statute.147  Prior to 1965, the Illinois revocation 
statute provided that a change in marital status revoked a will.148  However, 
                                                          
 139.  Id. at 916. 
 140.  Id.   
 141.  Id.  The court’s opinion notes how the three ate meals and participated in social activities 
together, the testator paid his former wife’s telephone bills, and the former wife occasionally cared 
for the testator in times of sickness.  Id.  
 142.  Id.   
 143.  Id. at 919.   
 144.  Id. at 916.   
 145.  Id. (noting that a legislatively enacted statute cannot be found to be a “wholly unreasona-
ble law” and thus, “would withstand attack as an arbitrary or capricious statute”). 
 146.  296 N.E.2d 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 308 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. 1974). 
 147.  Id. at 83. 
 148.  Id.   
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in 1965, the Illinois legislature decided to alter the revocation statute to 
provide that “[n]o will or any part thereof shall be revoked by any change in 
the circumstances, condition or marital status of the testator.”149  The court 
noted that the legislature’s intent was to “rectify inequitable situations such 
as the case before this court.”150  This outlook was short-lived.  The Illinois 
legislature reversed this decision in 1975, thereby reinstating the revocation 
doctrine when applied to the dissolution of marriages.151 
D.  Case Law Model: Nichols v. Suiter—A Case of Mix-Up in 
Maryland 
A recent Maryland Court of Appeals case, Nichols v. Suiter,152 pro-
vides an illustrative example of the complications that arise when a state 
fails to fully adopt the bright-line UPC standard.  In Nichols, the couple 
married in 1965, separated in 1996, and divorced in 2006.153  As a part of 
the separation agreement, the couple agreed to waive all rights to the other’s 
estate.154  However, the couple also provided that either party may still be-
queath any part of his or her estate to the other.155  Three years prior to the 
final divorce, the decedent executed his will, leaving the entire residue of 
his estate to his former wife, indicated by her specific name.156  The dece-
dent died shortly after the will was finalized in 2006, and his will was ad-
mitted to probate.157  The Maryland revocation statute states that a divorce 
will revoke all provisions in the will relating to the former spouse “unless 
                                                          
 149.  Id.   
 150.  Id.  Here, the decedent had executed a will in 1949.  In 1962, she married.  Prior to mar-
riage, the couple entered into a verbal agreement to disclaim all interest in any property the other 
owned.  After their marriage, the couple recognized this agreement in a written agreement execut-
ed in 1964.  The court found, reluctantly, that the ante-nuptial agreement was void based on the 
prior revocation statute.  Id. at 82, 84. 
 151.  The current Illinois revocation statute reads, in pertinent part:  
No will or any part thereof is revoked by any change in the circumstances, condition or 
marital status of the testator, except that dissolution of marriage or declaration of inva-
lidity of the marriage of the testator revokes every legacy or interest or power of ap-
pointment given to or nomination to fiduciary office of the testator’s former spouse in a 
will executed before the entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration 
of invalidity of marriage and the will takes effect in the same manner as if the former 
spouse had died before the testator.   
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-7 (West 2007). 
 152.  435 Md. 324, 78 A.3d 344 (2013). 
 153.  Id. 328–29, 78 A.3d at 346–47. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id. at 329–330, 78 A.3d at 347.  Instead of simply identifying the bequest as to “my 
wife,” the will provided, in pertinent part, “All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate and 
property whether real, personal or mixed . . . I give, devise and bequeath unto Virginia Lee Suit-
ers, if she survives me.”  Id. at 355, 78 A.3d at 342. 
 157.  Id. at 330, 78 A.3d at 347. 
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otherwise provided in the will or decree.”158  The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals reversed the lower court’s decision and found that the statute’s lan-
guage was clear and unambiguous.159  Accordingly, the separation agree-
ment’s general statement that either spouse could provide for the other, and 
the fact that the decedent did, in fact, execute a will leaving parts of his es-
tate to his former spouse, without referencing her status as “my wife,” did 
not suffice to satisfy the statute’s requirement that the a testator must “oth-
erwise provide[] in the will or decree” if he wishes to leave his estate to a 
former spouse160 
Nichols v. Suiter is just one illustration of the contradictions and con-
fusions that can occur when a state partially adopts the UPC’s clear and uni-
form language.161  However, this issue is not restricted to just the state of 
Maryland.162  Problems of ambiguity, contradictions, or a total lack of statu-
tory guidance are ubiquitous and are found across the jurisdictions of the 
United States. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The current failure of some states to adopt the revocation upon divorce 
doctrine has led to many inequitable and inconsistent judicial outcomes.163  
The frequency with which this issue arises has also created a call for legis-
lative action.164  Due to the growing complexity and fast pace of modern 
life, individuals are often lax in modifying their wills to properly reflect 
new, post-divorce intentions.165  In addition, testators often suffer from a 
misunderstanding that the divorce itself automatically revokes the will and 
effects the requisite re-designation.166  Unfortunately, this imposes a cost on 
all of the parties to the probate process.  First, without a consistent and ex-
press statutory guideline, courts are faced with an undesirable ultimatum: 
                                                          
 158.  See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105 (West 2014). 
 159.  Nichols, 435 Md. at 340, 78 A.3d at 353. 
 160.  Id. at 340, 78 A.3d at 353–54.  The court does acknowledge, “While the collective effect 
may be to permit an inference as to the testator’s intent, it does not establish that intent or even 
clearly and unequivocally state it.” Id. 340, 78 A.3d at 354. 
 161.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (2001).  This section states, in pertinent part: “[e]xcept 
as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument” (emphasis added). 
 162.  See infra Parts I.C.1–4. 
 163.  See supra Parts I.C.1–4. 
 164.  See generally David, supra note 8; Wilbanks, supra note 31; Raymond, supra note 92; 
Lynn, infra note 174; and Soliman, infra note 202. 
 165.  See David, supra note 8, at 412 (noting that simple difficulties of modern life “often work 
to prevent a testator from properly expressing his or her intent by modifying a will or will substi-
tute”). 
 166.  See Raymond, supra note 94, at 416 (asserting that jurisdictions that adopt a full and au-
tomatic revocation statute understand that a testator’s failure to change his will does not reflect an 
intention to bequest his estate to an ex-spouse, but rather, is likely the result of an “inadvertent 
misunderstanding” about the probate process). 
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permit the court to infer testator intent (leaving whole discretion to individ-
ual probate judges) or mandatorily forbid the court from straying from the 
will’s express (and outdated) terms.167  This often results in inconsistent 
outcomes.168  Second, the surviving spouse and family are often left with 
nothing.169  Third, the testator also suffers in that his or her updated inten-
tions post-divorce may not be fulfilled.170  Lastly, there is a strong constitu-
ent consensus and prevailing societal policy preference for clear, uniform, 
and consistent statutory law.171 
The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute offers a solution.  The rev-
ocation statute provides for the express revocation of all dispositions and 
provisions favoring the testator’s former spouse, “except as provided by the 
express terms” of the governing instrument.172  The states’ legislatures 
should universally adopt the statutory provisions set forth in the Uniform 
Probate Code’s revocation upon divorce statute, Section 2-804.  This would 
promote the efficient resolution of probate administration, protect the com-
mon testator who fails to change his will upon divorce, and better effectuate 
the new intentions of the divorced testator. 
A.  Efficiently Resolve Estate and Probate Administration 
There is an underwhelming amount of statutory and judicial guidance 
regarding the impact of wills post-divorce.  Adoption of the UPC’s revoca-
tion upon divorce statute would reduce unnecessary legal challenges, as in-
dividuals could rely on a state’s explicit statutory guidance.173  The current 
ambiguity and inconsistency in probate courts enables and encourages liti-
gation, with all its attendant expenses, costs, and delays.174  Because there is 
an unquestioned universal public interest in preventing litigation, a con-
sistent revocation upon divorce statute would offer “welcome guidance” to 
testators, beneficiaries, practitioners, and judges.175  Under such a statute, 
individuals could ensure the proper distribution of their property, judges 
would have a standard to apply to the more complex and complicated pro-
                                                          
 167.  See infra Part II.A. 
 168.  See cases cited supra Part I.C.1–4. 
 169.  See infra Part II.B. 
 170.  See infra Part II.C; see David, supra note 8, at 412 (pointing out that, more often than 
not, a testator’s intentions post-divorce will often differ substantially from those intentions held 
while happily married). 
 171.  See infra Part II.D; see Raymond, supra note 94, at 424–25. 
 172.  See supra note 14 for the full text of UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2001).  
 173.  Raymond, supra note 94, at 403; see also David, supra note 8, at 393 (noting that if Ten-
nessee had fully adopted the UPC revocation provisions, certain issues “could have been disposed 
of much more quickly”). 
 174.  See Robert J. Lynn, Will Substitutes, Divorce, and Statutory Assistance for the Unthink-
ing Donor, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 30 (1987) (mentioning that there is also an accompanying public 
interest in honoring the decedent’s intent for his or her estate). 
 175.  Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 917. 
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bate cases that are unable to be administered under the statutory guidelines, 
and the intended beneficiaries would receive their correct and intended 
share.176 
Although adoption of the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute 
would efficiently eliminate a large portion of unnecessary litigation, such a 
complete abolition could come at a cost.  Because the UPC provides for an 
automatic revocation at the time of the divorce decree, a court would be un-
able to personalize judicial remedies when faced with unique circumstanc-
es.  Therefore, there may be times where Section 2-804 may not best serve 
the testator’s true intent.  For example, in Nichols v. Suiter, the former 
spouse argued that her deceased ex-husband’s intent was to bequeath the 
entirety of his residuary estate to her.177  However, because the will lacked 
specific language stating that the testator intended this bequeath to remain 
with his spouse, even post-divorce, the Maryland Court of Appeals found 
the gift to be void.178  Such a fixed hard-and-fast rule could prove detri-
mental when applied to convoluted and emotionally driven probate situa-
tions. 
However, it is important to note that the UPC’s revocation upon di-
vorce statute offers only a “default rule.”179  This rule counterbalances the 
problem of a stale will in the absence of a testator’s specific instruction oth-
erwise.180  A testator still has several options in order to provide for a for-
mer spouse.  First, a testator may always write into his or her will that assets 
should still benefit a spouse regardless of the dissolution of the legal mar-
riage.181  Second, a testator can simply execute another will after the di-
vorce devising property to whomever he or she desires—including re-
designating a former spouse as a beneficiary.182  Because the revocation up-
on divorce provisions only apply to wills executed before a divorce, a testa-
tor could still provide for a former spouse, without any concern that these 
dispositions of property will be revoked.183  Third, in a testator’s original 
draft of his or her will, he or she can generally state that the revocation upon 
divorce statute should have no effect upon the disposition of his or her as-
sets.184  Although it could be argued that these options put an undue burden 
                                                          
 176.  Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 903. The author notes that the adoption of the UPC revoca-
tion statute would “clarify unanswered questions” in Vermont, where full adoption of the UPC’s 
revocation upon divorce statute has not yet been adopted.  Id. at 947. 
 177.  435 Md. 324, 78 A.3d 344 (2013); see discussion supra Part I.D.  Based on the facts of 
the case, this argument does have some merit. 
 178.  Nichols, 435 Md. at 340, 78 A.3d at 353–54. 
 179.  David, supra note 8, at 398–99. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 411. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
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on the testator, the UPC’s revocation upon divorce doctrine provides an un-
rivaled remedy that will produce “more equitable results more of the 
time.”185 
B.  Protect the Common Testator from Unintended Consequences 
The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute provides a “default plan” 
based on the common and frequent situation wherein a divorced testator 
fails to amend his or her estate plan post-divorce.186  This failure to change 
a will can be due to a myriad of reasons: simple forgetfulness, sudden and 
unexpected death, failure to comply with proper procedure, bad legal ad-
vice, or daily responsibilities.187  Furthermore, an everyday layperson, un-
educated and unaware of the complicated intricacies of probate law, might 
assume that a divorce, in and of itself, would automatically effect a change 
in the distribution of his or her estate.188  Regardless of the reasoning be-
hind the testator’s failure to properly modify his will, substantial inequities 
can result from this failure.189 
In addition, although the majority of the court decisions within juris-
dictions without explicit revocation statutes fortuitously resulted in a revo-
cation, the court’s opinion often noted that, in the absence of a property set-
tlement or general statute, the court would not have reached such a result.190  
This is problematic.  For instance, when following this logic, if a couple 
fails to settle their property in its entirety or if a state fails to create a gen-
eral revocation statute, no revocation would occur.  Often, this would leave 
assets to a former spouse—a situation the testator typically would not have 
intended nor desired. 
The UPC revocation upon divorce statute protects the testator from 
these unintended consequences by providing a default rule that aligns with 
the intent of the majority of individuals and ensures the proper distribution 
of the testator’s assets.191  The revocation statute “offer[s] more protection 
to the divorced decedent” than the ambiguous statutes currently enacted in 
                                                          
 185.  Id. at 411–12. 
 186.  Id. at 398–99, 384. 
 187.  Id. at 410–11 (quoting Mark Davis, Note, Life Insurance Beneficiaries and Divorce, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 635, 653 (1987)).  David notes that this failure to amend a will is an “all-too-
common circumstance[]” that often leads to inequitable results.  Id. at 411. 
 188.  Raymond, supra note 94, at 416 (“[A]n insured’s failure to make a beneficiary change 
does not necessarily mean he intended to give the proceeds to his ex-spouse, but rather could have 
resulted from an inadvertent misunderstanding about the nature of the divorce process in that the 
divorce itself did not effect a change in beneficiary status.”); see also David, supra note 8, at 399–
400 (discussing the UPC’s revocation provisions relating to a former spouse’s relatives and noting 
that a testator “would likely assume that if the law revokes provisions to a former spouse, it would 
also revoke provisions to a former spouse’s relatives under the same logic”). 
 189.  Raymond, supra note 94, at 416. 
 190.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
 191.  See infra Part II.C. 
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some states and far more protection for decedents residing in those jurisdic-
tions with a total lack of any revocation statute.192  A bright-line rule would 
also permit estate planners and practitioners to quickly eradicate mistaken 
beliefs and provide testators with a guaranteed way to achieve their person-
al intended plan. 
C.  Properly Effectuate and Execute Testator Intent 
The primary goal of probate courts is to “ascertain and give effect to 
the intent of the testator.”193  Typically, a testator would not intend for a 
former spouse to remain a beneficiary after his divorce.194  Usually a “di-
vorce itself” will provide enough evidence of such testator intent.195  How-
ever, without clear statutory guidance, the judiciary remains free to either 
adhere to the express terms of the outdated will or infer the updated testator 
intent.  The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute resolves this ambiguity 
and alleviates the pressure on the judiciary by providing a vehicle that au-
tomatically determines testator intent. 
Unfortunately, when faced with unusual circumstances, the conclusive 
nature of the UPC revocation upon divorce statute can simultaneously be-
come a wholly erroneous presumption.  For example, in In re Estate of 
Mercure, the former couple remained close neighbors—interacting hospita-
bly and assisting one another financially and socially.196  Although the court 
agreed that there was a “natural presumption” that a testator would intend to 
rescind his bequest to a former spouse, it also found the relationship to be 
so unique that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to rebut this pre-
sumption.197  In re Estate of Mercure is an unusual set of circumstances 
wherein the court was able to deliver an equitable judicial remedy.  Howev-
er, the court’s opinion still asserts its desire for a statutorily enacted revoca-
tion statute in order to eliminate uncertainty and minimize litigation.198  The 
                                                          
 192.  David, supra note 8, at 395.  The author also notes that the “growing complexity and fast 
pace of life often work to prevent a transferor from properly expressing his or her intent.”  Id. at 
412. 
 193.  George Chamberlain, Annotation, Cause of Action to Probate Will Presumptively Re-
voked or Altered as Result of Marriage, Divorce, Birth, or Adoption, 28 CAUSES OF ACTION 563, 
§ 2 (2014). 
 194.  See Raymond, supra note 94, at 412 (asserting that the Colorado state legislature, in 
adopting a revocation statute nearly identical to the UPC’s Section 2-804, understood that a testa-
tor’s failure to properly amend his insurance policy to remove his ex-spouse as a beneficiary was 
not a calculated intention but a mere oversight); see also Lynn, supra note 174, at 18 (noting that 
there is a legislative assumption that a testator’s failure to change his or her will is a mere matter 
of oversight and not an intentional decision). 
 195.  Raymond, supra note 94, at 416 (stating that the failure to amend a testator’s will “consti-
tuted a mere oversight because the execution of a final divorce decree exhibited the insured’s true 
intent to revoke the ex-spouse’s beneficiary status”). 
 196.  In re Estate of Mercure, 216 N.W.2d 914, 916 (Mich. 1974); see supra Part.I.C.3. 
 197.  Id. at 918–19. 
 198.  Id. at 916. 
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court recognized that, without such legislation, the future of estate law is 
left to the discretion of the judiciary.199  The UPC’s revocation upon di-
vorce statute would provide the definitive guidance for which courts are 
seeking. 
In addition, it is significant to note that the UPC revocation upon di-
vorce statute is only the “default rule.”200  The statute still allows for per-
sonalization of a testator’s estate.  For example, the testator in In re Estate 
of Mercure could have simply added a new amendment to his will, drafted 
an entirely new will, or drafted his original will to specifically state that a 
former spouse should still benefit even post-divorce—which would have 
avoided the probate litigation process entirely.201 
Because the UPC offers a set of general guidelines, the UPC drafters 
recognized that divorce usually constitutes “such a detrimental breakdown 
in a relationship that automatic alterations to a divorced spouse’s testamen-
tary plan were needed.”202  Clearly, the principal purpose of executing a 
will is to ensure that the proceeds of one’s estate go to the correct benefi-
ciary.203  Without a provision providing for an automatic revocation upon 
divorce, these proceeds may end up in the hands of an ex-spouse—contrary 
to testator intent.  State legislators need to recognize that the realities and 
complications of modern life necessitate the adoption of a revocation upon 
divorce statute in order to meet the needs of their citizens.204  States need to 
acknowledge changing family dynamics205 and adopt “rules that more accu-
rately reflect the probable intent of decedents and the complex relationships 
of the twenty-first century.”206  The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute 
provides a default rule that proves advantageous for the majority of testa-
tors, as well as simultaneously allows a testator with intentions that are dis-
tinct from the majority to personalize his will accordingly. 
                                                          
 199.   Id. 
 200.  David, supra note 8, at 398–99; see also supra Part II.A. 
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Mercure, 216 N.W.2d at 916. 
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for Beneficiary-Designated Nonprobate Assets, 36 STETSON L. REV. 397, 400 (2007).  The author 
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 203.  Raymond, supra note 94, at 424. 
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to better facilitate and effectuate a decedent’s intent, Wilbanks believes this purpose can best be 
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D.  Public Policy Preference for Clear, Uniform, and Consistent 
Statutory Law 
There is a strong and universal public policy preference for clear, uni-
form, and consistent statutory law.  Unfortunately, in regards to probate ju-
risprudence, many state legislatures are falling short of this objective.207  
Many experts in American probate law criticize the lack of consistency both 
between and within state courts.208  Among these same experts, however, 
there is near universal agreement that the UPC would offer clear and ex-
press guidelines to eradicate the inconsistencies and confusion.  The UPC 
provides “much needed clarity and certainty in the law,” and is “attractive 
in its simplicity.”209  Because probating an estate has the potential to have 
significant implications for individuals, rules governing estate probate must 
be “clear, strictly construed, and consistently applied.”210  In addition, be-
cause the revocation issue only arises after the testator has died and can no 
longer articulate his intent, a rule must be able to prevent confusion both 
before death (when the testator is drafting his or her will), and after death 
(in deciphering his intent).211  The UPC’s revocation upon divorce doctrine 
offers the perfect balance of straightforward guidance and proper effectua-
tion of testator intent.  Moreover, the UPC is a collaborative effort of com-
missioners from all jurisdictions, and thus, “its well-thought-out policy ra-
tionale [that] reflects modern social values, as well as various other 
concerns,” makes it universally applicable to all American jurisdictions.212 
E.  Comparison to Life Insurance Policies 
The 1990 revision to the Uniform Probate Code broadened the reach 
of the revocation upon divorce statute, extending it to non-probate assets, 
including life insurance, retirement benefits, annuities, and trusts.213  Simi-
lar to the conflicting judicial decisions surrounding the distribution of a tes-
tator’s estate, the distribution of life insurance policies has become equally 
                                                          
 207.  See supra Parts I.C.1–4. 
 208.  See, e.g., Soliman, supra note 202, at 418–19 (noting that the adoption of a revocation 
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provides reporter’s notes and decisions from other jurisdictions). 
 210.  Doris Del Tosto Brogan, Divorce Settlement Agreements, The Problem of Merger or In-
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(1988). 
 211.  Raymond, supra note 94, at 423. 
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 213.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2001) and comments.  
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as inconsistent.214  However, many leading authorities in the field are advo-
cating for full revocation of all non-probate assets, such as life insurance, 
which would affect both the direct beneficiary, as well as additional third 
parties.215  Although more convoluted and intrusive on private contract 
rights than the general revocation doctrine, many states have still chosen to 
adopt the UPC revocation provisions related to life insurance policies.216  
The strong support for enacting the UPC’s revocation provisions as applied 
to life insurance policies provides compelling justification for the seemingly 
simpler and more straightforward adoption of the revocation upon divorce 
doctrine as applied to probate assets. 
The impetus to wholly adopt the UPC revocation upon divorce statute 
stimulates particularly zealous discussion when contemplating life insur-
ance policies.217  This is largely because the life insurance industry signifi-
cantly impacts both individual Americans and the United States economy as 
a whole.218  According to a 2012 report by the American Council of Life 
Insurers, life insurance companies provided over $62 billion to life insur-
ance beneficiaries in 2011.219  Two out of three American families—75 mil-
lion total—depend on this financial and retirement security every year.220  
In addition, the life insurance industry invested $5.5 trillion into the U.S. 
economy, accounting for more than one-third of America’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).221 
                                                          
 214.  Compare Hollaway v. Selvidge, 548 P.2d 835 (Kan. 1976), Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. 
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What makes the distribution of life insurance policies particularly 
complicated is the common understanding that a life insurance constitutes a 
separate contract between the insured policyholder and the insurance com-
pany.222  Because the policy is viewed as private contract, the life insurance 
company has a contractual duty to uphold the terms of the insurance con-
tract—which means paying the policy proceeds to the insured’s designated 
beneficiary.223  As a contract, the beneficiary’s claim is wholly unrelated to 
the spousal status of the couple, and rather stems from the precise terms of 
the insurance policy issued.224  This contractual duty to execute the testa-
tor’s formal intent, as evidenced by the text of the life insurance policy, 
conflicts with the testator’s inferred intent to remove his former spouse as a 
beneficiary.225  Additionally, life insurance policies are usually transferred 
directly and immediately to the named beneficiaries, irrespective of any 
change in marital status.226  In most cases, this automatic transfer would be 
efficient, as a testator’s beneficiaries would be able to avoid the lengthy and 
expensive probate process.227  However, in the case of a divorced testator, 
and with 75 million families relying on these crucial benefits, this could 
prove disastrous.228  Without a revocation statute in place, the rightful bene-
ficiaries—the testator’s current family—are deprived of these crucial bene-
fits at a vital time.229 
The policy reasons behind upholding the explicit terms of the life in-
surance policy are generally argued as follows: (1) an insured’s failure to 
formally change his former spouse’s status is evidence of his intent to keep 
his former spouse as a beneficiary; (2) the legislative and judicial systems 
want to protect the third-party insurance company from being held liable for 
breach of contract when it dispenses the policy’s proceeds to the wrong per-
son; and (3) because a life insurance policy is technically a private contract 
and a non-probate asset, probate courts should not have an active role in its 
disbursement and should be bound to follow the contract terms.230  Howev-
er, these critiques have not stopped many states from adopting the UPC 
revocation provisions as applied to life insurance policies.231  These states 
are willing to accept the minor costs that arise from an automatic revocation 
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in order to provide a policy that better effectuates testator intent, protects 
the testator and his rightful beneficiaries, and prevents the testator’s mistak-
en belief that a divorce itself will automatically change the beneficiary sta-
tus of his life insurance policy.232  As Hailey H. David points out, “blood is 
thicker than water,” and, more often than not, a divorced decedent would 
prefer that his assets pass to his heirs, as opposed to his former spouse.233  
In addition, legislatures recognized that divorce constitutes “such a detri-
mental breakdown in a relationship that automatic alterations to a divorced 
spouse’s testamentary plan [are] needed.”234  The realization that testators 
are often lax in revising their wills was also a driving force behind this 
trend.235 
In her article, A Fair Presumption: Why Florida Needs a Divorce Rev-
ocation Statute for Beneficiary-Designated Nonprobate Assets, Suzanne So-
liman,236 notes that revoking a beneficiary’s status at the time of dissolution 
is the “logical” solution.237  The dissolution provides a “definitive moment” 
for identifying when the marriage—and by implication, the policy contract 
and beneficiary designation—is terminated.238  Furthermore, adopting the 
Uniform Probate Code’s recommendations promotes consistency in the 
whirlwind of present-day probate court decisions.239 
Without a revocation statute, the consequences of an inaccurate distri-
bution of a testator’s life insurance policy are similar to the repercussions 
faced when distributing a testator’s probate assets.  However, life insurance 
policies raise even more complicated issues than does the distribution of 
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probate assets because they implicate the additional dimension of private 
contract law.  The trend to extend revocation upon divorce statutes beyond 
probate assets to include nonprobate assets, such as life insurance, which is 
embraced and fully adopted by some states, has the potential for far greater 
implications.240  As such, although the push for a revocation upon divorce 
statute as applied to life insurance policies offers a substantive analogy, the 
greater purpose of this analogy is to provide a baseline comparison.  If 
some state legislatures are willing to venture into private contract law in or-
der to better effectuate testator intent and promote justice, the remainder of 
states without an express revocation upon divorce statute should at least 
adopt the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute as it applies to probate 
matters. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute provides a concrete and 
objective device to interpret a decedent’s will in a confusing and emotional-
ly driven situation—the probating of a loved one’s estate.  The lack of 
statutory guidance thus far has provided for inconsistent and contradictory 
judicial decisions regarding the impact that a divorce has on a will.  To re-
solve this problem, state legislatures should universally adopt the statutory 
provisions set forth in the Uniform Probate Code’s revocation upon divorce 
statute, Section 2-804.  This would promote the efficient resolution of pro-
bate administration, protect the common testator who fails to change his 
will upon divorce, and better effectuate the new intentions of the divorced 
testator.  Adoption of the UPC’s revocation upon divorce doctrine is war-
ranted by multiple “principles of equity and due consideration of a dece-
dent’s intent.”241  Additionally, it is important that this solution be articulat-
ed in a statute rather than through judicial opinions.242  This Comment has 
explored the numerous complications that arise when a state fails to fully 
adopt this clear bright-line standard, as well as provided a thorough analysis 
of the positive implications of full adoption. 
Enactment of the revocation upon divorce statute would not eliminate 
testator choice.  Rather, it merely shifts the “default rule” from one in which 
a former spouse is likely to benefit from the decedent’s estate, to a new rule 
that accounts for the change in circumstances and properly allocates the es-
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tate’s assets to the decedent’s current surviving loved ones.243  Testators 
still have many options in order to provide for their former spouses if they 
so wish.244  Therefore, reversing this presumption would better effectuate 
testator intent, as well as provide definite guidance in cases where the par-
ties have not expressly stated their intentions.245  With the modern marriage 
and divorce trends in mind, all state legislatures should take note and rec-
ognize the importance and necessity of adopting this statute. 
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